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D a l e  D o r s e y
francis hutcheson’s theory of value is often characterized as a precursor 
to the qualitative hedonism of John stuart Mill. The interpretation of Mill as a 
qualitative hedonist has come under fire recently; some have argued that he is, 
in fact, a hedonist of no variety at all.1 others have argued that his hedonism 
is as non-qualitative as Bentham’s.2 The purpose of this essay is not to critically 
engage the various interpretations of Mill’s value theory. rather, I hope to show 
that Hutcheson should not be read as a qualitative hedonist.
The evidence for Hutcheson as a qualitative hedonist is strong and striking. The 
most commonly cited passages are taken from his posthumous opus, A System of 
Moral Philosophy. However, a closer look at Hutcheson’s moral psychology, includ-
ing his account of the interplay between pleasure and the moral and evaluative 
senses, shows that Hutcheson’s hedonism is best read quantitatively. Hutcheson’s 
hedonism is for that reason deceptive, and deceptively simple. 
i .  h u t c h e s o n  a s  q u a l i t a t i v e  h e d o n i s t
Hedonism is a wide and varied philosophical program. Because hedonism comes 
in many shapes and sizes, there are—at least—two important questions relevant for 
any hedonist doctrine: first, “hedonism about what?”; second, “hedonism of what 
sort?” With regard to the first question, there are many different lines of inquiry 
one might approach with a form of hedonism, including the psychological nature 
of human motivation, the nature of happiness or well-being, or the foundation 
of moral obligations.3 In this essay, I leave aside Hutcheson’s views concerning 
motivation and moral obligation to focus on his account of happiness, well-being, 
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1 David Brink, “Mill’s Deliberative Utilitarianism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 21 (1992): 
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2 Jonathan riley, “Millian Qualitative superiorities and Utilitarianism, Part I,” Utilitas 20 (2008): 
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or prudential value. Hutcheson is explicit about the distinction between moral 
goodness, motivation, and “natural goodness” or well-being.4 and it is clear that 
Hutcheson is at least some sort of hedonist when it comes to the latter topic. In 
the Inquiry, Hutcheson writes, 
Because we shall afterwards frequently use the Words Interest, advantage, natural Good, 
it is necessary here to fix their Ideas. The Pleasure in our sensible Perceptions of any 
kind, gives us our first Idea of natural Good, or Happiness; and then all objects which 
are apt to excite this Pleasure are call’d immediately Good. … our sense of Pleasure 
is antecedent to advantage or Interest, and is the Foundation of it. We do not perceive 
Pleasure in objects, because it is our Interest to do so; but objects or actions are ad-
vantageous, and are pursu’d or undertaken from Interest, because we receive Pleasure 
from them. our perception of Pleasure is necessary, and nothing is advantageous or 
naturally Good to us, but what is apt to raise Pleasure mediately, or immediately.5
Further, as he writes in opening the Illustrations on the Moral Sense, “In the following 
Discourse, Happiness denotes pleasant Sensation of any kind, or a continued state 
of such Sensations; and Misery denotes the contrary Sensations.”6 
Hutcheson is thus a hedonist about human happiness or well-being. (For 
brevity, I will hereafter use “hedonism” to mean “hedonism about happiness or 
well-being.”) But that he is a hedonist leaves many questions about his value theory 
unanswered; views of very different characters are properly described as versions 
of hedonism. The question I seek to answer here concerns whether Hutcheson is 
best described as a quantitative or qualitative hedonist. according to quantitative 
hedonism, the prudential value of a pleasure is given simply as a function of its 
pleasurableness. When attempting to compare two distinct pleasurable sensations, 
quantitative hedonism declares that the only features of the sensations relevant to 
their evaluative assessment are intensity and duration. a pleasure can be made less 
valuable by shortening its duration, or dulling its intensity, but in no other way.
Qualitative hedonism is different. Qualitative hedonism maintains that there 
is a third bit of information relevant to assessing the prudential value of different 
pleasures. Pleasures differ not only in intensity and duration, but also in quality. 
Different qualitative hedonists will assess the criteria of “quality” differently. one—
surely too simple—way is to separate various pleasures by a distinction between 
“bodily” pleasures and the pleasures of the “mind.” so, for instance, it might be 
that the raw sensory pleasurableness of, say, drinking margaritas is higher than the 
raw sensory pleasurableness of, say, solving a complicated problem in mathemat-
ics (if measured purely in terms of intensity and duration). But one might argue 
that the pleasurableness of solving this math problem is of higher quality than 
the pleasurableness of drinking margaritas. Though the pleasure of a margarita 
4 see, for instance, Francis Hutcheson, “essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions” in An 
Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense [Essay], 
ed. aaron Garrett (1728; repr., Indianapolis: liberty Fund, 2002), II.iii, 34–36. In referring to the 
Essay, I will precede textual citations with Essay, followed by the section number, sub-section number, 
and page number.
5 Hutcheson, Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue [Inquiry], ed. Wolfgang liedhold 
(1725; repr., Indianapolis: liberty Fund, 2004), II.intro.1, 86. Hereafter, Inquiry, followed by treatise, 
section, subsection, and page numbers.
6 Hutcheson, “Illustrations on the Moral sense,” in Essay, 133.
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wins out when it comes to intensity and duration, mathematical achievement wins 
when it comes to quality.
Qualitative hedonists can differ in the associated evaluative weight apportioned 
to intensity, duration, and quality. a hedonist will be a qualitative hedonist so long 
as pleasurable quality of itself matters to welfare—even though it might matter, 
evaluatively speaking, little in comparison to intensity and duration. although Mill 
occasionally appears to do so,7 the qualitative hedonist need not hold that differ-
ence in quality trumps difference in intensity and duration. a qualitative hedonist 
must say only that, of two pleasures of equal intensity and duration, the higher 
quality pleasure is more valuable.
Mill—at least on the traditional reading of his value theory—offers a paradig-
matic example of qualitative hedonism. as he writes in Utilitarianism, 
It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the su-
periority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, 
uncostliness, &c., of the former—that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than 
in their intrinsic nature. and on all these points utilitarians have fully proved their 
case; but they might have taken the other, and, as it may be called, higher ground, with 
entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the 
fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. 
It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as 
well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should depend on quantity alone.8 
Thus, if Mill is a hedonist, he appears to be a straightforwardly qualitative hedo-
nist. He admits that, rather than simply on the basis of intensity and duration 
(i.e. “quantity”), pleasures should also be judged on the basis of quality. Previous 
“utilitarian writers” have been in the thrall of quantitative hedonism. Mill desires 
to move beyond this.
Most read Hutcheson as a precursor to Mill in shrugging off the purely quantita-
tive superiority of the “higher” pleasures.9 In his brief discussion of the qualitative 
hedonists of old, rem B. edwards mentions Hutcheson as an early innovator of 
qualitative hedonism: “Most traditional hedonists such as epicurus, Bentham, and 
sidgwick have been quantitative hedonists, but Francis Hutcheson and John stuart 
Mill introduced an interesting complication into the modern theory of hedonism 
by insisting that pleasures differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively.”10 Jonathan ri-
ley writes that “quantity of pleasant feeling plays a subsidiary role in [Hutcheson’s] 
ethical system. … [F]or Hutcheson, qualitative superiority so far outweighs quan-
titative superiority as to render it, in comparison, of small account.”11 
7 see, for instance, Utilitarianism, ed. roger Crisp (1861; repr., oxford: oxford University Press, 
1998), II.6, 56–57. Mill’s Utilitarianism will be cited by chapter, paragraph, and page numbers.
8 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.4, 56.
9 Mark strasser argues for Hutcheson as a qualitative hedonist, though his view will share one im-
portant feature of my argument: strasser recognizes that Hutcheson believed that the higher pleasures 
are better than lower pleasures also along the dimension of quantity. see strasser, “Hutcheson on the 
Higher and lower Pleasures,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 25 (1987): 517–31, at 518.
10 rem B. edwards, Pleasures and Pains: A Theory of Qualitative Hedonism (Ithaca, Ny: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1979), 30.
11 Cf. riley, “Millian Qualitative superiorities and Utilitarianism, Part I,” 275. riley’s reading is id-
iosyncratic; for riley, no one is properly characterized as a hedonist unless that person believes that all 
facts about value make reference only to inherent facts about particular pleasurable sensations. Because
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It is important, first, to investigate what sort of evidence would—and would 
not—point to a non-quantitative reading of Hutcheson’s hedonism. For instance, 
Hutcheson divides pleasures by “kinds,” and explicitly links the inquiry into the 
various “kinds” of pleasure with the inquiry into our “true happiness.” But mere 
talk of “kinds” of pleasure need not mark out Hutcheson as a qualitative hedonist. 
The quantitative hedonist can distinguish kinds of pleasure if the “higher” kinds 
are not marked out as such in qualitative terms. For instance, Hutcheson might 
identify kinds of pleasure in terms of the bodily/mental distinction, while claim-
ing that the superiority of the mental pleasures is to be understood in quantita-
tive terms (as Mill attributes to previous “utilitarian writers”). Furthermore, the 
quantitative hedonist can distinguish pleasures in terms of pleasurable quality so 
long as “quality” is not itself a per se determinant of welfare value. For example, 
a Benthamite might also claim that certain pleasures are of higher quality than 
others. (one might index pleasurable quality to moral quality, for instance.) Never-
theless, for the Benthamite, quality itself will have no per se relevance to well-being 
or happiness. The Benthamite might also claim that a pleasure’s quality matters 
to its welfare value, but only indirectly: higher quality pleasures just happen to be 
those that are most pleasurable quantitatively. a qualitative hedonist, on the other 
hand, must claim that a pleasure’s quality matters of itself.
Despite these caveats, there is a good deal of evidence that Hutcheson’s fa-
vored view is a qualitative hedonism. For instance, in A System of Moral Philosophy, 
Hutcheson writes, 
To discover wherein our true happiness consists we must compare the several enjoy-
ments of life, and the several kinds of misery, that we may discern what enjoyments are 
to be parted with, or what uneasiness to be endured, in order to obtain the highest 
and most beatifick satisfactions, and to avoid the most distressing sufferings.
as to pleasures of the same kind, ’tis manifest their values are in a joint proportion 
of their intenseness and duration. … In comparing pleasures of different kinds, the 
value is as the duration and dignity of the kind jointly. We have an immediate sense 
of a dignity, a perfection, or beatifick quality in some kinds, which no intenseness of 
the lower kinds can equal, were they also as lasting as we could wish.12 
In this passage, Hutcheson appears to evaluate pleasures in qualitative terms: for 
instance, “a dignity, a perfection, or beatifick quality.” Hutcheson distinguishes 
pleasures of different kinds based not only on their intensity and duration, but 
also on their dignity (or perfection, or “beatifick quality,” or, occasionally, “excel-
lence”). Hutcheson also seems to link differences in dignity or quality directly to 
differences in value. He appears to claim that pleasures of greater quality have 
there are no inherent facts about particular pleasurable sensations save intensity and duration (i.e. 
quantity), qualitative hedonism, for riley, is impossible. (Cf. riley, “Millian Qualitative superiorities and 
Utilitarianism, Part I,” 270.) Hence, for riley, Hutcheson fails to be a hedonist in virtue of rank-ordering 
pleasures by a factor of quality. I do not wish to dispute riley’s taxonomy. If the reader is inclined to 
follow riley’s taxonomy, she is welcome to read this paper as a defense of Hutcheson as a genuine 
hedonist, as opposed to arguing that Hutcheson is one type of hedonist rather than another.
12 Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy [System], ed. Daniel Carey (1755; repr., New york: 
Continuum, 2005), I.ii.7.i, 116–17; my emphasis. Citations are divided into Book, Part, Chapter, sub-
chapter, and page numbers.
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the power to outweigh the pleasures of the “lower kinds,” no matter the intensity 
and duration of the lower kinds. This suggests that not only does Hutcheson 
think that pleasurable quality matters of itself, but also that pleasurable quality is 
of substantial weight—no intenseness of the lower kinds can equal the value of the 
higher pleasures. Hutcheson thus seems to be making reference explicitly to three 
operators when it comes to the welfare value of a particular pleasure: intensity, 
duration, and “beatifick quality.”13 
Further, Hutcheson declares that “no intenseness or duration of any external 
sensation gives it a dignity or worth equal to that of the improvement of the soul 
by knowledge, or the ingenious arts; and much less is it equal to that of virtuous 
affections and actions” (System, I.ii.7.i, 117). He goes on to say that “By this inti-
mate feeling of dignity, enjoyments and exercises of some kinds, tho’ not of the 
highest degree of those kinds, are incomparably more excellent and beatifick 
than the most intense and lasting enjoyments of the other kinds” (System, I.ii.7.i, 
117). again, for Hutcheson, pleasures that are of greater “dignity” will, simply 
for this reason (“By this intimate feeling of dignity”), outweigh the most intense 
and lasting enjoyments of an undignified pleasure. It is worth noting here that 
Hutcheson explicitly links the notion of “dignity” with pleasurable quality: it is by 
the feeling of dignity that certain kinds of pleasure are more excellent than oth-
ers, and hence, presumably, more valuable. again worth noting is the compara-
tive claim. Hutcheson appears to insist on some form of discontinuity or lexical 
priority: no intenseness or duration of a lower pleasure could allow it to outweigh 
the excellence of higher pleasures.
It is worth pausing here to better examine Hutcheson’s use of the term “dig-
nity” and the relationship between “dignity,” “beatifick quality,” and pleasurable 
“excellence.” according to Hutcheson, human beings are born with a collection of 
moral and evaluative senses, the most important of which—for his moral theory—is 
obviously the moral sense, which, according to Hutcheson, is the sense “by which 
we perceive Virtue, or Vice in our selves, or others” (Essay, I.i, 17). In the Inquiry, 
Hutcheson claims that the moral sense also perceives ideas of “dignity”: “some 
actions have to Men an immediate Goodness; or, that by a superior sense, which I 
call a Moral one, we approve the actions of others, and perceive them to be their 
Perfection and Dignity, and are determin’d to love the agent; a like Perception we 
have in reflecting on such actions of our own without any View of further natural 
advantage from them” (Inquiry, II.Intro.i, 88).14 In the Essay, however, Hutcheson 
also introduces the idea of “perceptions” of dignity, independent of the moral 
sense: “there are perhaps other Perceptions distinct from all these Classes, such as 
some Ideas of Decency, Dignity, Suitableness to human Nature in certain actions and 
Circumstances … even without any conception of Moral Good or evil” (Essay, I.i, 
18). By the time of the System, Hutcheson speaks of a unique “sense of dignity” 
(System, I.i.2.vii, 27). Hence, in claiming that “by this intimate feeling of dignity” 
some pleasures are “incomparably excellent and beatifick,” Hutcheson seems to 
hold that through these evaluative senses—either the moral sense itself, or the 
13 Cf. strasser, “Hutcheson on the Higher and lower Pleasures,” 518–19.
14 This passage occurs in the fourth, or “D” (1738) edition of Hutcheson’s Inquiry, 215n15.
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non-moral sense of dignity—we come to see that certain pleasures are suitable 
to human nature, or contribute to our perfection, just as we would perceive the 
virtue or vice of a particular action or character; doing so constitutes perceiving 
a “dignity” in a particular pleasure. on the qualitative reading of Hutcheson’s 
hedonism, when we perceive a “dignity,” this establishes that such pleasures are 
of greater “excellence” or “beatifick quality.” and because the sense of dignity 
perceives the “perfection” or “suitability to human nature” of certain pleasures, 
the excellence or quality of a particular pleasure is accounted for in perfection-
ist terms: the quality of a pleasure is ascertained by the sense of dignity (or our 
various perceptions of dignity), and is ascertained as such by the sense of dignity 
given its suitability to human nature.
Hutcheson’s System is a late (indeed, posthumous) account of his moral phi-
losophy. But shades of qualitative hedonism appear to crop up even in his earliest 
works. For instance, in the Inquiry, Hutcheson writes, “We are indeed determin’d 
to judge Virtue with Peace and safety, preferable to Virtue with Distress; but that 
at the same time we look upon the state of the Virtuous, the Publick-spirited, even 
in the utmost natural Distress, as preferable to all affluence of other enjoyments” 
(Inquiry, II.vi.1, 165). Furthermore, in the Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the 
Passions, Hutcheson asks, in rhetorical fashion, “Who has ever felt the Pleasure 
of a generous friendly Temper, of mutual Love, of compassionate Relief and Succour to 
the distressed; of having served a Community, and render’d the Multitudes happy? 
… Who would not, upon reflection, prefer that State of Mind, these Sensations of 
Pleasure, to all the enjoyments of the external Senses, and of the Imagination with-
out them?” (Essay, V.iii, 94). Here, Hutcheson appears to be suggesting that the 
various moral pleasures—those that, in the System, he declared to display a form 
of dignity—are worth whatever the price in the pleasures of the external senses 
and pleasures of the imagination. How this suggestion could be coherently held 
unless Hutcheson supported some index of evaluation beyond mere intensity 
and duration is difficult to see. However, this passage is particularly interesting 
because Hutcheson adds a footnote deferring to shaftsbury’s Inquiry Concerning 
Virtue or Merit, itself plausibly reflecting a qualitative hedonism: “The Pleasures of 
the Mind being allow’d, therefore, superior to those of the Body; it follows, ‘That 
whatever can create in any intelligent Being a constant flowing series or Train of 
mental enjoyment, or Pleasures of the Mind, is more considerable to his Happi-
ness, than that which can create to him a like constant Course or Train of sensual 
enjoyments, or Pleasures of the Body.’”15 
Hutcheson’s value theory appears to be not only a version of qualitative hedo-
nism, but a qualitative hedonism of particular sophistication. Hutcheson makes 
fine-grained distinctions in the quality of different pleasures. rather than, like Mill, 
grouping pleasures into two relevant kinds (higher and lower), Hutcheson notes 
several different kinds of pleasure: first are the pleasures of the “external senses,” 
second the pleasures of the “imagination” (such as the “improvement of the soul 
by knowledge and the ingenious arts”), third the pleasures of sympathetic engage-
15 shaftesbury, “an Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit” in Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, 
Times (1711; repr., Indianapolis: liberty Fund, 2001), II.i, 58.
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ment with others, and fourth the pleasures of virtue. These pleasures are listed 
in order of increasing quality. as riley notes, “In Hutcheson’s ethical system, the 
‘moral pleasures’ of the ‘virtuous affections and actions’ are ranked as the highest 
kind, followed by the pleasures of the ‘sympathetic and kind feelings’ (typically 
confined to kin and a few close friends), and then by the pleasures of the intellect 
and of the imagination, with the ‘sensual pleasures’ (largely of the palate and of 
sex) as ‘the meanest’ kind.”16 Furthermore, even in comparing the pleasures of 
the external senses with the pleasures of the internal senses, Hutcheson appears 
to commit himself to a strong evaluative relationship: “The Pleasures of the inter-
nal Senses, or of the Imagination, are allowed by all, who have any tolerable Taste 
of them, as a much superior Happiness to those of the external Senses, tho they 
were enjoyed to the full” (Essay, V.ix, 104). Thus these distinctions in pleasurable 
quality appear to directly affect welfare value: the pleasures of the internal senses 
constitute a “superior Happiness to those of the external Senses,” even if the latter 
were “enjoyed to the full.” Thus the difference in types of pleasures also appears 
to illuminate a per se evaluative difference.
In short, there is very good evidence available for the claim that Hutcheson 
admits a third dimension of hedonic assessment beyond mere intensity and dura-
tion, perceived by our sense of dignity (or moral sense, operative as perceiver of 
dignity), and that this dimension plays a direct role in the welfare value of pleasures. 
I argue, however, that this reading is mistaken. The plan for the remainder is as 
follows. In §2, I examine Hutcheson’s discussion of the superiority of the pleasures 
of virtue in his early works, in particular, the Inquiry and Essay. Importantly, in 
explaining the prudential importance of virtue, Hutcheson makes no mention of 
pleasurable quality; instead he explains this evaluative superiority in terms of plea-
surable intensity and duration. In §3, I respond to the possibility that Hutcheson’s 
pre-System writings are incongruous with the System, which itself presents a form of 
qualitative hedonism. I argue that though Hutcheson’s moral psychology evolves 
between these works, his value theory does not. For Hutcheson, though he wishes 
to discuss the excellence of various pleasures, the quality of a pleasure is only 
relevant to its welfare value insofar as excellent pleasures are, or yield, pleasures 
of greater intensity and duration. In §4, I respond to an important objection, viz. 
that Hutcheson’s strong comparative axiological claims (both in his pre-System 
writings, and in the System) are incompatible with quantitative hedonism. 
2 .  q u a n t i t a t i v e  h e d o n i s m  p r e - s y s t e m
Though (as noted above) Hutcheson makes some claims reminiscent of a quali-
tative hedonism in his pre-System writings (especially of the qualitative hedonism 
found in John stuart Mill), there is substantial evidence, some of it quite direct, 
that Hutcheson prior to the System held a straightforward quantitative hedonism. 
Consider, for instance, the following passage from the Essay: “The Value of any 
16 riley, “Milliam Qualitative superiorities and Utilitarianism, Part I,” 276. riley’s reading of 
Hutcheson’s axiology is to some degree problematic because it appears to leave out various pleasures 
Hutcheson admits, including the pleasures of the sense of honor (Essay, V.vii, 101–2). Thanks to an 
anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. (Cf. System, I.ii.7.iii–viii, 122–34.)
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Pleasure, and the Quantity or Moment of any Pain, is in a compounded Proportion 
of the Intenseness and Duration” (Essay, V.i, 87). However, this passage (and others 
like it) presents a puzzle. If Hutcheson believed that the value of pleasures were 
solely measured by their intensity and duration, how are we to explain passages 
from the Essay and Inquiry in which he appears to judge pleasures qualitatively? 
For instance, how are we to explain his explicit commitment to the value of the 
pleasures of virtue (e.g. Essay, V.iii, 94), or the state of the “Publick-spirited” as 
“preferable to all affluence of other enjoyments” (Inquiry, II.vi.1, 165)? 
Throughout Hutcheson’s career, it was important to him to claim that virtue 
was a prudential benefit to the virtuous. Hutcheson’s account of the value of virtue 
(concentrating on the Essay and Inquiry for the moment) runs more or less in two 
stages. First, according to Hutcheson, as people we are led to reflect upon our 
own behavior. If our behavior is virtuous, this triggers the pleasures of the moral 
sense: we perceive virtue in our own conduct and take pleasure as a result. (as 
Hutcheson states in the Essay, a “sense” just is a “Determination of our Minds to receive 
Ideas independently on our Will, and to have Perceptions of Pleasure and Pain” [Essay, I.i, 
17].) second, Hutcheson believes that the source of this pleasure is prudentially 
crucial—the pleasures generated by the moral sense are of supreme welfare value. 
Consider, for instance, the following passage from the Inquiry: 
[W]hen we are under the Influence of a virtuous Temper, and thereby engaged in 
virtuous actions, we are not always conscious of any Pleasure, nor are we only pursuing 
private Pleasures, as will appear hereafter: ’tis only by reflex acts upon our Temper 
and Conduct that we enjoy the Delights of Virtue.17 When also we judge the Temper 
of another to be virtuous, we do not necessarily imagine him then to enjoy Pleasure, 
tho’ we know reflection will give it to him. … a virtuous Temper is called Good or 
Beatifick, not that it is always attended with pleasure in the agent; much less that 
some small pleasure attends the Contemplation of it in the approver: but from this 
that every spectator is persuaded that the reflex acts of the virtuous agent upon his 
own Temper will give him the highest Pleasures. (Inquiry, II.i, 8)18 
This passage clearly illustrates the psychological process by which we come to take 
pleasure in our own virtue. It is not the case, according to Hutcheson, that every 
virtuous action is guided or motivated by some pleasurable or happy feeling—far 
from it. (Indeed, Hutcheson appears to insist that the motive to virtue, rather than 
involving the pleasurable reflection on our own conduct, involves the pleasures 
of the “publick sense” or “disinterested Affections towards our Fellows” [Essay, IV.v, 
83].) rather, virtue is in our interest given our own “reflex acts”: reflection on our 
own conduct and character. When the moral sense is active, it provides a certain 
pleasure—the pleasure of the moral sense. Thus the prudential importance of 
virtuous behavior is explained in the Inquiry via the pleasures of the moral sense 
(the “highest” pleasure) that are obtained in reflection upon our own conduct.
This passage is neutral between qualitative and quantitative readings of 
Hutcheson’s hedonism. Indeed, the qualitative reading might seem to offer a 
17 There is some dispute as to the authoritative statement of this last sentence. Hutcheson appears 
to have revised the sentence to read: “’tis only by reflex acts upon our Temper and Conduct that Virtue 
never fails to give Pleasure.” In any event, the upshot of this passage is identical.
18 again, this passage appears in the “D” (1738) version of the Inquiry, 217n47.
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plausible explanation for the welfare value of these “reflex acts.” The moral sense 
delivers pleasure of high quality; hence in activating the moral sense, the pleasure 
one achieves is of tremendous value. Though this is perhaps a plausible account 
of the prudential value of virtue, it is not Hutcheson’s account (or, at least, not 
Hutcheson’s account in the pre-System writings). In explicating the value of the 
pleasures of the moral sense, Hutcheson commits himself to an explanation told 
in purely quantitative terms. In section VI of the Inquiry, Hutcheson considers 
the “Importance of this moral sense to the present Happiness of Mankind,” and 
explicitly seeks to prove that the moral sense “gives us more Pleasure and Pain 
than all our other Facultys” (Inquiry, II.vi.1, 162).19 Taking Hutcheson at his word, 
it would appear that the reason the reflection on our own virtuous conduct is 
prudentially beneficial is not that the pleasures of the moral sense are of higher 
quality or dignity, but rather that the moral sense, when active, grants more pleasure. 
Thus, when he refers to the “highest Pleasures,” Hutcheson appears—at least in 
the Inquiry—to understand pleasurable “height” in quantitative terms: the “high-
est” pleasures are just those pleasures that are of greatest quantity.
one obviously wonders how it is that the pleasures of the moral senses are of 
greater quantity. By way of a response, it is helpful to consider a rather Millian 
passage from the Essay extolling the pleasures of virtue. Hutcheson declares that 
in trying to ascertain the value of any particular pleasure, one must consult the 
opinions of competent judges. “It is obvious that ‘those alone are capable of judg-
ing, who have experienced all the several kinds of Pleasure, and have their Senses 
acute and fully exercised in them all’” (Essay, V.ii, 89). like Mill, Hutcheson 
claims that the final verdict on the value of a particular pleasure must belong to 
the competent judges. of course, competent judges, Hutcheson surmises, will be 
on the side of virtue; the pleasures of virtue are the most valuable, not just in a 
one-to-one comparison with other pleasures, but also in comparison to “all others 
jointly” (Essay, V.ii, 89). 
Hutcheson’s explanation of the affection of the competent judges for the 
pleasures of the moral sense, however, is given in explicitly quantitative terms. as 
noted above, Hutcheson claims that the value of a pleasure is established in terms 
of its intensity and duration (Essay, V.i, 87). according to Hutcheson, duration 
is easily established by considering the “Constancy of our relish or Fancy” (cf. Es-
say, V.x–xi, 105–10). But in ascertaining the intensity of a pleasure, we have no 
recourse but to consult competent judges: 
To compare these several Pleasures and Pains as to their Intenseness, seems difficult, 
because of the Diversity of Tastes, or Turns of Temper given by Custom and Education, 
which make strange Associations of Ideas, and form Habits; from whence it happens, 
that, tho all the several kinds of original senses and Desires seem equally natural, 
yet some are led into a constant Pursuit of the Pleasures of the one kind, as the only 
enjoyment of life, and are indifferent about others. … Now upon comparing the 
several Pleasures, perhaps the sentence of the Luxurious would be quite opposite to 
that of the Virtuous. The Ambitious would differ from both. Those who are devoted to 
the internal Senses or Imagination, would differ from all three. (Essay, V.i, 88) 
19 My emphasis.
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For Hutcheson, the competent judges solve an epistemic problem. He sees that 
certain people have different backgrounds, tastes, or proclivities, and hence that 
people will disagree in their perceptions of the intensity of various pleasures. This 
is why, in trying to ascertain the genuine comparative intensity of pleasures, we 
are led to ask those who have had substantial experience of the higher as well as 
lower pleasures. like Mill, Hutcheson grants the final authority over the value of 
a particular pleasure to the competent judges. However, unlike Mill (or unlike 
Mill as generally read) Hutcheson does not claim that the competent judges will 
issue verdicts that are guided by pleasurable quality independently of pleasurable 
quantity. rather, the competent judges are judges of intensity. Hence in explain-
ing the superiority (i.e. the greater welfare value) of the pleasures of the moral 
sense, Hutcheson claims that the pleasures of the moral sense are not of greater 
quality, but rather that the moral sense is “the Fountain of the most intense Pleasure” 
(Essay, V.x, 106).20 
This fact itself should be enough to cast significant doubt on Hutcheson qua 
qualitative hedonist. after all, in explaining the prudential value of “reflex acts” 
upon our own virtuous conduct, Hutcheson makes no per se reference to plea-
surable quality. He instead insists that the superiority of the moral pleasures is 
explained by the greater intensity of the pleasures of the moral sense. This does 
not, by itself, prove that Hutcheson is a quantitative hedonist: after all, Hutcheson 
might have revised his views by the time of the System. Furthermore, it might be 
that Hutcheson holds that in addition to being of greater intensity, the pleasures of 
the moral sense are of higher quality (in a way that is directly relevant to welfare 
value). But Hutcheson’s explicit reliance on a quantitative evaluation of pleasures 
in justifying the prudential benefits of virtue is strong evidence of a quantitative 
hedonism. 
Before I move on to discuss the System, I should note one potential objection 
to a quantitative reading of Hutcheson’s early axiology.21 For Hutcheson, one 
important feature of the virtuous person (which is present, to some degree, in all 
persons) is a strong “publick sense,” or a “Determination to be pleased with the 
Happiness of others, and to be uneasy at their Misery” (Essay, I.i, 19). But because 
the world contains so much suffering (on Hutcheson’s own admission), the pain of 
the “publick sense” might very well be thought to outweigh any purely quantitative 
amount of pleasure derived from one’s “reflex acts.” as Hutcheson writes in the 
Essay, “The publick Happiness is indeed, as to external appearance, a very uncertain 
object; nor is it often in our power to remedy it, by changing the Course of Events. 
There are perpetual Changes in Mankind from Pleasures to Pains, and often from 
Virtue to Vice. our public Desires must therefore frequently subject us to Sorrow; 
and the pleasures of the publick Sense must be very inconstant” (Essay, V.x, 105–6). 
Thus Hutcheson would appear unable to account for the prudential value of virtue 
if the pleasures of the moral sense are deemed superior only quantitatively: only 
20 Furthermore, Hutcheson considers the pleasures of the moral sense and the other higher 
pleasures to be longer lasting—but the long duration of the pleasures of the moral sense is to some 
degree imperfect, and cannot guarantee pleasure free of “Uneasiness” (Essay, V.x, 106–7).
21 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for inspiring this objection.
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if the moral sense provides higher-quality pleasure could Hutcheson guarantee 
that the pains of the public sense (which accompany a virtuous attention to the 
suffering of others) are outweighed.
But this feature of the public sense need not shed doubt on a quantitative read-
ing of Hutcheson’s hedonism. Hutcheson holds that the prudential value of virtue 
depends upon a belief in divine providence: “against this there is no relief but the 
Consideration of a ‘good governing Mind, ordering all for good in the whole, with 
the belief of a future State, where the particular seeming Disorders are rectified’” 
(Essay, V.xi, 109).22 Without this belief, according to Hutcheson, the prudential 
value of virtue is chimerical: it will be overtaken by the pains of public sympathy 
and engagement with others (see Essay, VI.iv, 123).23 If so, it would appear that 
there is no need to declare that the prudential benefit accompanying our own 
moral “reflex acts” is qualitatively superior. rather, virtue is beneficial only on the 
assumption of a belief in providence, which guarantees that the engaging one’s 
“publick sense” will generate pleasure of sufficient quantity to outweigh the pains 
one experiences at the suffering of others.
Thus it appears that the best reading of Hutcheson’s value theory, at least in 
the Essay and Inquiry, is a quantitative hedonism. Hence we should be reluctant 
to conclude that Hutcheson is a qualitative hedonist unless there is dispositive 
evidence that Hutcheson changed his views from the Essay to the System. In what 
follows, I argue that there is no such evidence, either in the System or in earlier 
works; whatever evidence there is of qualitative hedonism permits, I argue, of a 
perfectly plausible quantitative interpretation. This fact, in light of Hutcheson’s 
more or less explicit commitment to quantitative hedonism in his early works, 
provides us good reason to accept the quantitative reading of Hutcheson’s value 
theory. 
3 .  t h e  s y s t e m
The passages from the Essay and Inquiry just explored would seem to provide sub-
stantial reason to revise the standard view of Hutcheson’s value theory. The natural 
response, however, is to admit that Hutcheson adopted a quantitative hedonism 
in the early writings, but substantially revised his axiological commitments by the 
time of the System. Indeed, if my reading of the Inquiry and Essay is correct, we 
might be tempted to conclude that Hutcheson changed his views between the 
publication of the Essay (first published in 1728) and the System (posthumously 
published in 1755, but substantially complete by 1737).24 Indeed, there appear 
to be many ways in which Hutcheson revised his thought between the Essay and 
the System. Though Hutcheson discusses “perceptions” of dignity in the Essay, he 
has not yet developed the idea of a “sense of dignity” (cf. Essay, I.i, 18). However, 
22 For a helpful account of the influence of the public sense on the prudential value of virtue—
including the role of belief in providence in establishing the stability of the prudential value of virtue—
see James a. Harris, “religion in Hutcheson’s Moral Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 
(2008): 205–22.
23 see also Harris, “religion in Hutcheson’s Moral Philosophy,” 214–15.
24 Cf. Daniel Carey, Introduction to System, v. see also William robert scott, Francis Hutcheson: His 
Life, Teaching, and Position in the History of Philosophy [Francis Hutcheson] (New york: august M. Kelley, 
1900), 210.
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the System discusses the “sense of dignity” in far more detail. This has led some 
commentators to conclude that the System represented a substantial departure 
from Hutcheson’s earlier work. William scott, for instance, writes,
[In Hutcheson’s System], there is much that is new—not merely in matter but also 
in theory and form. In addition to the tendency giving prominence to the position 
of Will in Morality, the ideas of Perfection and Dignity (which received mere inci-
dental mention in the Essay on the Passions [sic.]) now constitute an integral part of 
the revised system. … Hitherto the end of Hutcheson’s work has always been frankly 
eudaemonistic, and further since Happiness was merely a sum of pleasures, it was 
nothing more than hedonism; now, on the contrary, Happiness and Perfection be-
come twin ends, presumably coincident.25 
Daniel Carey claims that the System “is at times unwieldy and difficult to integrate, 
which accounts in some measure for Hutcheson’s dissatisfaction with it.”26 (Inci-
dentally, if scott and Carey are correct, those who propose to read Hutcheson as a 
qualitative hedonist must explain why we should treat Hutcheson’s System—which 
is an idiosyncratic work, left unpublished at the time of his death—as a better 
representative of his considered views than the Essay or Inquiry, which were not 
only published during his lifetime, but underwent a substantial number of subse-
quent revisions. If Hutcheson’s works are in tension, why treat the System—as riley, 
edwards, and strasser do—as authoritative?27) Given scott’s analysis, we might be 
tempted to conclude that Hutcheson held a quantitative hedonism about happi-
ness or well-being through the Essay, but (given the passages previously discussed 
in the System) altered his view to reflect a qualitative hedonism by 1737—in effect, 
making happiness and perfection “coincident ends” by declaring that the pleasures 
of virtue are of higher quality given their perfection.
This reading is certainly possible. But I think we need not adopt it. a minor 
point first: the final edition of the Essay was published in 1742—five years after 
Hutcheson’s System was (in the eyes of most commentators) complete. But the final 
edition of the Essay, no less than the first edition, reflects a quantitative treatment 
of the pleasures of the moral sense: the moral sense does not deliver pleasure of 
greater quality, but rather of greater quantity. (For instance, he did not revise his ex-
plicit commitment to quantitative hedonism at Essay V.i.) Furthermore, Hutcheson 
did not confine himself to mere surface-level changes to the Essay over the years. 
Hence it would be quite odd to attribute to Hutcheson a shift from quantitative 
to qualitative hedonism from the period 1728–37 given that the 1742 edition of 
the Essay is explicitly quantitative in its treatment of the evaluative superiority of 
the higher pleasures. The same holds of the Inquiry, which was itself last revised 
in 1738, again with the explicitly quantitative passages left intact.
But leave this aside. There is a more important reason why we should not treat 
Hutcheson’s System as reflecting a qualitative hedonism: the text of the System 
25 scott, Francis Hutcheson, 214. I should say that scott’s reading of Hutcheson’s treatment of 
perfection is controversial. Happiness and perfection, as dual ideas, also show up in the Essay (VI.vii, 
129–32)—Hutcheson claims not that perfection is an additional end, but rather that we are naturally 
led to perfection by an increase in our happiness, as a result of a benevolent deity.
26 Carey, Introduction to System, vi.
27 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point.
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permits of a perfectly good quantitative reading, one that renders Hutcheson’s 
value theory consistent but keeps on display an evolving moral psychology. I take 
this argument in two stages. First, I address Hutcheson’s supposed inclusion of a 
welfare-relevant quality operator in the System. second, I address the claim that 
Hutcheson himself explicitly rejects a quantitative distinction between kinds of 
pleasure, given that he seeks to replace all talk of pleasurable intensity with talk 
of pleasurable quality or “excellence.” 
3.1. Pleasure and Dignity 
as noted in §1, the standard reading of Hutcheson’s value theory—at least in the 
System—is that some pleasures are marked out as possessing a “dignity,” which 
itself renders them of greater welfare value independently of their intensity and 
duration. But this reading is in tension not simply with pre-System writings, but 
with other passages from the System. Consider, for instance, the following curious 
passage: 
The chief happiness of any being must consist in the full enjoyment of all the grati-
fications its nature desires and is capable of; or if its nature admits of a great variety 
of pleasures of different and sometimes inconsistent kinds, some of them also higher 
and more durable than others, its supreme happiness must consist in the most 
constant enjoyment of the most intense and durable pleasures, with as much of the 
lower gratifications as consists with the full enjoyment of the higher. In like manner; 
if we cannot ward off all pain, and there be different kinds and degrees of it, we must 
secure ourselves against the more intense and durable kinds, and the higher degrees 
of them; and that sometimes by bearing the lower kinds or degrees, or by sacrificing 
some smaller pleasures, when ’tis necessary for this end. (System, I.ii.6.i, 100) 
Here Hutcheson explicitly links “supreme happiness” with the “most intense and 
durable pleasures.” Hence it would appear that a qualitative reading of System 
I.ii.6.i is well-motivated. and though Hutcheson appears to make reference to 
certain markers of a qualitative hedonism (“higher” pleasures, “lower” pains, etc.), 
a qualitative reading of this passage cannot be supported. In particular, consider 
Hutcheson’s discussion of pain. Hutcheson claims that we have reason to suffer 
the “lower kinds” when doing so allows us to better avoid the higher. But this 
makes sense only if we read “lower” quantitatively. on a qualitative reading, what 
is a “lower” pain? Presumably it must mean “lower quality” pain, i.e. pain of lesser 
suitability to human nature. But this is especially puzzling, given that Hutcheson 
urges us to avoid the higher pains and suffer the lower. Why, on a qualitative reading, 
should Hutcheson insist that we suffer a pain of lower quality (or of lower “dig-
nity” or “perfection”) rather than a pain of higher quality? a qualitative hedonist 
should insist on the opposite: if pain is to be suffered, why not suffer the pain that 
is of greater excellence, or “beatifick quality”? Thus Hutcheson’s recommenda-
tion that we suffer the “lower kinds” of pain makes sense only when we read the 
“height” of a pain quantitatively, i.e. as the sensible advice to take less pain rather 
than more when one can. But if the “height” of pains is to be read quantitatively, 
there is little justification for reading the “height” of pleasures, at least in this pas-
sage, qualitatively. on my reading, Hutcheson’s account of “supreme happiness” 
runs as follows: happiness is defined in quantitative terms (“the most intense and 
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durable pleasures”); the “higher gratifications” are simply identified as those 
kinds of pleasure that are more intense and durable.28 Indeed, careful attention 
to Hutcheson’s corpus reveals that he often uses “higher” as a mark of greater 
quantity, as we saw above in considering the treatment of moral pleasures in the 
Inquiry. Thus there appears to be good reason to read System I.ii.6.i as committing 
Hutcheson to a quantitative evaluative metric.
But if so, how are we to reconcile System I.ii.6.i with the more qualitative-
sounding passages in I.ii.7? Consider again Hutcheson’s argument for the pru-
dential value of virtue. For Hutcheson, the pleasures of virtue are the pleasures 
of reflection on our own virtuous conduct—pleasures of the moral sense. Hence, in 
triggering the pleasures associated with the moral sense, one experiences pleasure 
that is of greatest intensity. This explains the esteem of the competent judges 
and vindicates Hutcheson’s claim in the Inquiry that the moral sense yields more 
pleasure than other sources: the pleasures of the moral sense are pleasures of the 
greatest intensity.
But the prudential importance of these “reflex acts” is not limited to reflection 
on our own virtue. For Hutcheson, we can enjoy the pleasures of the evaluative 
senses in reflection on our pleasures, no less than our own conduct. Hutcheson 
writes that the moral sense and various evaluative senses evaluate not only actions 
or conduct, but also objects of desire, states of mind, passions, and indeed pleasures 
themselves. Indeed, in the System, Hutcheson claims that the sense of dignity plays a 
similar role to the moral sense in the evaluation of objects, actions, and pleasures 
(although in a way that remains independent of the moral sense): 
Tho’ it is by the moral sense that actions become of the greatest consequence to our 
happiness or misery; yet ’tis plain the mind naturally perceives some other sorts of 
excellence in many powers of body and mind; must admire them, whether in ourselves 
or others; and must be pleased with certain exercises of them, without conceiving 
them as moral virtues. We often use words too promiscuously, and do not express 
distinctly the different feelings or sensations of the soul. let us keep moral approbation 
for our sentiments of such dispositions, affections, and consequent actions, as we 
repute virtuous. We find this warm approbation a very different perception from the 
admiration or liking which we have for several other powers and dispositions; which 
are also relished by a sense of decency or dignity. (System, I.i.2.vii, 27) 
according to Hutcheson, dignified objects or activities are those that are suitable 
to human nature. But this sense of suitability or sense of dignity has a substantial 
effect on the quantity of pleasure we achieve: 
Thus, according to the just observation of aristotle, “The chief happiness of active 
beings must arise from action; and that not from action of every sort, but from that 
sort to which their nature is adapted, and which is recommended by nature.” When 
we gratify the bodily appetites, there is an immediate sense of pleasure, such as the 
brutes enjoy, but no further satisfaction; no sense of dignity upon reflection, no good-liking 
28 It is illuminating to consider, for comparative purposes, a nearly identical passage from 
Hutcheson’s Essay: “Happiness consists in ‘the highest and most durable Gratifications of, either all 
our Desires, or, if all cannot be gratify’d at once, of those which tend to the greatest and most durable 
Pleasures” (Essay, IV.v, 80). But it is clear, given the explicit commitment to quantitative hedonism in 
the Essay, that Hutcheson means to understand the “highest and most durable Gratifications” in terms 
compatible with quantitative hedonism.
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of others for their being thus employed. There is an exercise of some other bodily 
powers which seems more manly and graceful. There is a manifest gradation; some 
fine tastes in the ingenious arts are still more agreeable; the exercise is delightful; the 
works are pleasant to the spectator, and reputable to the artist. The exercise of the 
highest powers of the understanding, in discovery of truth, and just reasoning, is the 
more esteemable, when the subjects are important. But the noblest of all are the virtu-
ous affections and actions, the objects of the moral sense.29 (System, I.i.2.vii, 29) 
Hutcheson concurs with aristotle, but his explanation is given in quantitative terms: 
when we engage activities that suit our nature, or that are dignified, we engage our 
sense of dignity, and subsequently take intense and long-lasting pleasure (though 
not as intense as the pleasure of the moral sense)—via our sense of dignity—in our 
activities and states of mind. Hence, by the time we get to the System, Hutcheson 
has expanded the variety of evaluative senses that can be triggered by “reflex acts”: 
here, the sense of dignity is engaged when we reflect on our own activities and 
states of mind—the sense of dignity delivers pleasure when we engage in activities 
or feel pleasures that are suitable to human nature. This reading is supported by 
a passage, at System I.ii.7.i, in which Hutcheson claims (just as he does at Inquiry 
I.ii.8) that we are not motivated toward dignified actions or states of mind because 
we take pleasure in such reflex acts: “Nor is it a view of private sublime pleasures 
in frequent future reflections which recommends virtue to the soul. We feel an 
impulse, an ardour toward perfection, toward affections and actions of dignity, and 
feel their immediate excellence, abstracting from such views of future pleasures of 
long duration” (System, I.ii.7.i, 118). However, in estimating our happiness, these 
reflex acts are to be regarded as of the first importance: “Tho’ no doubt these 
pleasures, which are as sure as our existence, are to be regarded in our estimation 
of the importance of virtue to our happiness.”
The operation of the moral sense and the sense of dignity sheds light on 
the most qualitative-sounding passages from the System, especially Hutcheson’s 
account of the notion of pleasurable “excellence” and the link between pleasur-
able excellence and pleasurable dignity. Consider the following: “By this intimate 
feeling of dignity, enjoyments and exercises of some kinds … are incomparably 
more excellent and beatifick than the most intense and lasting enjoyments of the 
lower kinds.” Here Hutcheson claims that by our “feeling of dignity” we discern 
the greater excellence of some pleasures. But the excellence of particular kinds 
of pleasures is not, of itself, relevant to their welfare value. The excellence we discern 
simply is the perfection, or suitability to human nature, of a particular pleasure. 
excellent pleasures are more prudentially valuable not because they are, simply, 
more suitable to human nature. rather, their perfection or suitability to human 
nature triggers, as a result of “reflex acts,” the evaluative senses, which are them-
selves sources of long-lasting, intense pleasure. It is true that the pleasures of virtue, 
for instance, are more excellent, dignified, or “suitable to human nature.” But this 
excellence is not itself relevant to prudential value. The various pleasures—even 
those that are more or less excellent—are more or less valuable only because they 
are more or less pleasurable, given the added pleasures of the sense of dignity (and, 
in the case of the pleasures of virtue, the moral sense).
29 My emphasis.
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Given all this, though Hutcheson speaks in terms of the dignity, or excellence, 
of various pleasures, we should not regard these as evaluative markers that in and 
of themselves extend welfare value. It just so happens that excellent, dignified 
pleasures extend welfare value by triggering our evaluative senses, which themselves 
are sources of “higher,” i.e. more intense and lasting, pleasure. 
3.2. Intensity as Quality? 
one passage from the System offers a substantial challenge to the possibility of 
reading the System as presenting a quantitative hedonism of the sort offered in 
the Inquiry and Essay. Hutcheson writes that “as to pleasures of the same kind, 
’tis manifest their values are in a joint proportion to their intenseness and dura-
tion. … In comparing pleasures of different kinds, the value is as the duration 
and dignity of the kind jointly” (System, I.ii.7.i, 117). Here Hutcheson appears to 
state, quite explicitly, a quantitative account of the comparison of pleasures of the 
same kind, while rejecting this quantitative rubric in favor of a qualitative one for 
pleasures of different kinds.
He goes on to write, 
Now if we denote by intenseness, in a more general meaning, the degree in which 
any perceptions or enjoyments are beatifick, then their comparative values are in 
a compound proportion of their intenseness and duration. But to retain always in 
view the grand differences of the kinds, and to prevent any imaginations that the 
intenser sensations of the lower kinds with sufficient duration may compleat our 
happiness; it may be more convenient to estimate enjoyments by their dignity and 
duration: dignity denoting the excellence of the kind, when those of different kinds 
are compared; and the intenseness of the sensations, when we compare those of the 
same kind. (System, I.ii.7.i, 118–19) 
This passage is noted by edwards, strasser, and riley30 in arguing for Hutcheson 
qua qualitative hedonist, and it is not difficult to see why. Hutcheson appears to 
be giving us a stipulative definition of intensity: we must understand intensity 
simply as the extent to which any particular pleasure is “beatifick.” only under 
that assumption could pleasures of different kinds be compared by their intensity 
and duration. For the sake of clarity (or “convenience”), however, Hutcheson 
simply replaces all talk of intensity with talk of dignity when it comes to evaluat-
ing pleasures. But what does “dignity” mean in this context? It should be noted 
that Hutcheson appears to be using “dignity” here in an idiosyncratic way. When 
comparing the welfare values of pleasures of different kinds, dignity refers to “ex-
cellence” (which is determined, as argued above, by the sense of dignity). When 
the excellence of a pleasure is not at issue, dignity simply means “intensity.” leav-
ing aside this interesting terminological move for the moment, the trouble for a 
quantitative reading would appear to arise from the first use of “dignity,” i.e. to 
refer to the “excellence” of a particular pleasure. Hutcheson appears to suggest 
that the only relevant operators when comparing pleasures of different kinds 
are excellence and duration. But Hutcheson is careful to note that this is different 
30 Cf. also Jonathan riley, “Millian Qualitative superiorities and Utilitarianism, Part II,” Utilitas 
21 (2009): 127–43, at 129n5.
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than an evaluation that is based on intensity and duration, which applies only to 
pleasures of the same kind.
Though this passage seems to clearly point in favor of Hutcheson qua qualita-
tive hedonist, the qualitative reading of this passage is awkward. If Hutcheson 
wished to claim that the pleasures of different kinds are of different welfare values 
merely given the fact that some are of greater excellence, it is a bit mysterious why 
he would allow a comparison of all pleasures to be given along the dimension of 
dignity (“excellence”) and duration. Why say that pleasures of different kinds are 
to be compared on the basis of their duration at all? Why not suggest that they 
are to be compared only on the basis of their excellence? one possibility might be 
that hedonic quantity also plays a role in comparing pleasures of different kinds. 
surely any qualitative hedonist could agree. But then it becomes equally mysteri-
ous why intensity—in its standard quantitative understanding—is simply left out 
and replaced by the excellence operator when comparing pleasures of different 
kinds. What is so special about duration when it comes to determining pleasurable 
quantity? It would seem more plausible, and more coherent with a qualitative he-
donism, to suggest that pleasures of different kinds are either compared by their 
intensity, duration, and excellence, or excellence alone, rather than the bizarre 
and apparently unmotivated combination of excellence and duration.
Thus Hutcheson’s replacement of intensity with “dignity” (which can refer ei-
ther to excellence or intensity, depending on context) appears to be something of 
an enigma. one possible interpretation of this passage—especially in light of the 
seemingly contradictory passage at System I.ii.6.i—is that Hutcheson may not have 
realized, or fully understood, the distinction between quantitative and qualitative 
hedonism.31 This might explain Hutcheson’s puzzling axiological combination of 
excellence and duration, rather than the coherent options, of which there are 
three: intensity and duration (which would yield a quantitative hedonism), excel-
lence alone (which would entail a qualitative hedonism), or excellence, intensity, 
and duration (which would also entail a qualitative hedonism). We might simply 
conclude that Hutcheson was unaware, given his failure to fully grasp the distinc-
tion between qualitative and quantitative hedonism, that his own preferred option 
is unmotivated in light of this distinction.
We might certainly accept that Hutcheson did not possess a clear picture of the 
distinction between qualitative and quantitative hedonism as we currently under-
stand it. But the failure to fully understand this distinction—assuming that he does 
fail to understand it—does little to shed light on the passage at hand, especially as 
it concerns Hutcheson’s replacement of intensity with excellence in comparison 
of pleasures of different kinds. after all, Hutcheson was in clear command of the 
extent to which both intensity and duration are required for an estimation of 
the amount of pleasure one experiences (this is clear from System I.ii.6.i, but also 
from Hutcheson’s adroit understanding of pleasurable quantity in the Essay). 
so he clearly understood the components of pleasurable quantity. Furthermore, 
Hutcheson, in this very passage, claims that to assess pleasures of the same kind, 
we compare only their intensity and duration, not their excellence and duration. 
31 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this possibility.
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Hence he appears in this passage to be well aware that comparing pleasures by 
their excellence is different than simply assessing them by their quantity—which, 
as he clearly understands, is measured by intensity and duration (here “dignity” 
denotes intensity directly). Hence his conglomeration of excellence (denoted by 
“dignity”) and duration in assessing pleasures of different kinds is striking indeed: 
why, given that he knew full well the importance of intensity and duration in as-
sessing pleasurable quantity, would he have excised intensity, but kept duration? 
I think that Hutcheson’s replacement of “intensity” with “dignity” (when de-
noting excellence) is philosophically significant, and not the product of an error 
or a failure to understand the difference between quantitative and qualitative 
hedonism. But it is not, I claim, an alteration of Hutcheson’s quantitative hedonist 
axiology. of course, my reading is not wrinkle-free, but it has substantial virtues, 
including allowing Hutcheson to remain consistent with his previous statements 
on the nature of happiness, and avoiding committing Hutcheson to elementary 
blunders. Instead of reading System I.ii.7 as an alteration in Hutcheson’s theory of 
the nature of human happiness, I suggest that we read these passages as a pragmatic 
guide to the pleasures that are best pursued in an attempt to achieve happiness. In 
other words, when Hutcheson claims that we should assess pleasures of different 
kinds by their excellence and duration, he is saying that assessing pleasures by the 
excellence of their kind along with their duration is a better prudential action-
guide than assessing pleasures by simply their intensity and duration (except, of 
course, when excellence is not at issue).
This reading fits with Hutcheson’s overarching moral philosophical goals. 
Hume (in the Treatise, and in a letter composed to Hutcheson himself) famously 
distinguishes between two roles a moral theorist might play, the “anatomist” and 
the “painter.”32 While Hume saw himself as the anatomist, content to provide an 
exhaustive theory of morality which could then be used by others (moralists, or 
“painters”) to instill a reverence for virtue in readers, Hutcheson sees his task as 
akin to the painter. according to Hutcheson, “The intention of moral philosophy 
is to direct men to that course of action which tends most effectually to promote 
their greatest happiness and perfection; as far as it can be done by observations 
and conclusions discoverable from the constitution of nature” (System, I.i.1.i, 1; 
my emphasis). Hence it would be no surprise that, in the System, Hutcheson would 
attempt to provide an account of the value of competing pleasures that would best 
direct men toward their “greatest happiness and perfection.”
This reading explains the differences between System I.ii.6.i and System I.ii.7.i. 
The prior passage is an account of the welfare value of alternative pleasures, put in 
quantitative terms. But System I.ii.7.i is an action guide. This is clear from Hutcheson’s 
own stage-setting of System I.ii.7.i: “To discover wherein our true happiness consists 
we must compare the several enjoyments of life, and the several kinds of misery, 
that we may discern what enjoyments are to be parted with, or what uneasiness to 
be endured, in order to obtain the highest and most beatifick satisfactions, and to 
avoid the most distressing sufferings” (System, I.ii.7.i, 116–17).33 In other words, 
32 see David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (1740; 
repr., oxford: oxford University Press, 2007), III.3.6.6, 395.
33 My emphasis.
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in the later passage Hutcheson means to offer an account of the properties of 
various pleasures that should best direct our choices between them. Given this, the 
point of Hutcheson’s replacement of intensity with excellence should be clearer. 
Hutcheson is not arguing that excellence rather than intensity is a determinant of 
welfare value. rather, Hutcheson is claiming that excellence rather than intensity 
is a better guide to those enjoyments that are to be “parted with” or “endured.”
But why is excellence and duration a better action-guide than intensity and 
duration? To answer this question, we must look closely at Hutcheson’s text. re-
call that, for Hutcheson, the shift from intensity and duration to excellence and 
duration is intended to “prevent any imaginations that the intenser sensations 
of the lower kinds with sufficient duration may compleat our happiness.” It is 
“more convenient” to judge pleasures of different kinds only on the basis of the 
excellence of the kind, along with duration. But why would it be a more conve-
nient action-guide to replace intensity with excellence, but not duration with the 
excellence of a pleasure also? The answer is simple. as Hutcheson claims in the 
Essay, the perception of intensity—but not perception of duration—is influenced 
by variation in taste. as he says in Essay V.i, the extent to which particular pleasures 
are of greater intensity will depend on, for instance, whether one is a “luxurious 
debauchee” or has experienced the pleasures of virtue. Hence, in offering an ac-
tion guide, Hutcheson wishes to blunt the possibility of misunderstanding given 
the difference in taste: that, so long as they are sufficiently intense, the pleasures 
of the lower kinds can outweigh the pleasures of virtue, or of the imagination. 
Hence to “prevent any imaginations that the intenser sensations of the lower 
kinds with sufficient duration may compleat our happiness,” we replace intensity 
with the excellence of the kind. This gives us a more reliably universal guide to 
those pleasures that are to be endured or parted with in the pursuit of happiness. 
Had Hutcheson merely said, “intensity and duration,” rather than “dignity and 
duration,” the “luxurious debauchee” would, given his taste, have interpreted 
this as a call to continue the life of the external senses, a claim Hutcheson wishes 
to dispute. In so doing, Hutcheson reframes his in-depth examination of each 
type of pleasure, allowing him merely to compare their excellence and duration, 
rather than intensity and duration—which is apt to be rejected by those of dif-
fering tastes. When the excellence of a kind is not at issue—when the sense of 
dignity is indifferent between two pleasures, hence when differences in taste are 
unlikely to lead people prudentially astray—he simply allows dignity to denote 
“intensity” directly. replacing “intensity” with dignity, when it comes to pleasures 
of different kinds, is, as Hutcheson says explicitly, a matter of convenience. Further-
more, replacing intensity with excellence is fully compatible with Hutcheson’s 
quantitative axiology. excellent pleasures simply result in pleasures that are of 
greatest intensity; pleasures that are suitable to human nature trigger the pleasure 
of the sense of dignity. 
In short, my pragmatic reading of System I.ii.7.i runs as follows. Hutcheson is 
not seeking to provide us with an account of the welfare value of pleasures; this 
he has already done one chapter earlier. rather, he seeks to give us an account of 
the pleasures that should be pursued (a) that is compatible with his axiology and 
(b) that avoids the discrepancies in perception of pleasurable intensity. For this 
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reason, Hutcheson replaces talk of intensity with talk of pleasurable excellence 
(when pleasures differ along the dimension of excellence). Because perception 
of pleasurable duration is not similarly controversial, there is no need to replace 
talk of duration.
The pragmatic reading of Hutcheson’s passage might sound a bit awkward. But it 
is no more awkward than the qualitative reading, which must explain the role “dura-
tion” plays in the comparison of pleasures of different kinds (given that this reading 
also allows no place for a traditional intensity operator), and which must attribute 
to Hutcheson incoherence not only with previous works (such as the Essay), but 
previous passages in the same work. We may be convinced that Hutcheson simply 
did not recognize the distinction between qualitative and quantitative hedonism, 
and therefore was unaware of his textual incoherence. But my reading plausibly 
interprets Hutcheson’s text at System I.ii.7.i, refrains from committing Hutcheson 
to a bizarre hedonic calculus, allows Hutcheson to remain consistent concerning 
the “chief happiness” of humankind, and also reflects Hutcheson’s overall moral 
theoretic goals. Thus there is, I think, reason enough to accept it. 
4 .  o b j e c t i o n :  v a l u e  s u p e r i o r i t y
I have so far argued that Hutcheson’s complex moral psychology provides the 
resources to read various crucial paragraphs from the System and elsewhere as as-
serting not that the higher pleasures are better because they are of higher quality, 
but that they are better because they trigger our moral sense and sense of dignity, 
and hence lead, overall, to a greater quantity of pleasure.
But is this really plausible in light of Hutcheson’s various axiological claims? In 
particular, one might argue, Hutcheson goes to great pains to suggest that the weight 
of various pleasures differs in a way that could only be explained if he adopted some 
form of qualitative hedonism. after all, he writes that virtue is “incomparably” better 
than “the most lasting sensual pleasures.” Here Hutcheson seems to gesture toward 
something like the lexical dominance of the higher pleasures over the lower pleasures. 
lexical dominance is the highest form of evaluative priority: a value x is lexically 
dominant over a value y if and only if any amount of x, no matter how small, will 
outweigh any finite amount of y. But if all pleasures are identified by intensity and 
duration, this is incoherent.34 any equivalent quantity of two kinds of pleasure must 
be of equivalent value. How, then, could pleasures of one kind be lexically dominant 
over pleasures of another kind? How, then, could the smallest possible amount of 
one kind of pleasure be worth “the most lasting” pleasures of a different kind?
This objection counts against the quantitative reading only if the quantitative 
reading can give no plausible account of Hutcheson’s axiological claims. But 
though these passages are suggestive of lexical superiority, they are at best incon-
clusive. Consider the following quote from the System: “We have an immediate sense 
of a dignity, a perfection, or beatifick quality in some kinds, which no intenseness 
of the lower kinds can equal, were they also as lasting as we could wish. No in-
tenseness or duration of any external sensation gives it a dignity or worth equal to 
that of the improvement of the soul by knowledge, or the ingenious arts” (System, 
34 Cf. riley, “Millian Qualitative superiorities and Utilitarianism, Part I,” 261–64.
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I.ii.7.i, 117). also, “By this intimate feeling of dignity, enjoyments and exercises 
of some kinds, tho’ not of the highest degree of those kinds, are incomparably 
more excellent and beatifick than the most intense and lasting enjoyments of the 
lower kinds” (System, I.ii.7.i, 117). on the quantitative reading, these passages 
are not meant to claim that the welfare value of the higher pleasures is lexically 
superior to the welfare value of lower pleasures. The quantitative reading will 
insist that Hutcheson’s reference to an incomparably higher dignity (or “beatifick 
quality”) of some kinds of pleasure means just that: the higher pleasures will be 
incomparably more dignified than the lower pleasures. external sensations—the 
lowest kind of pleasure—simply will not be suitable to human nature no matter 
how intense or long-lasting they are. The pleasure of ancient roman gluttony will 
never achieve a comparable dignity to that of the pleasures of the moral sense. But 
for the quantitative reading, dignity is not a per se determinant of welfare value. 
rather, dignity determines welfare value only insofar as the sense of dignity is trig-
gered on reflection and leads to long-lasting, intense (“higher”) pleasure. Hence 
to read this passage as insisting on a form of lexical dominance, one must already 
hold that dignity is a per se determinant of welfare value. But to do this is to simply 
beg the question against the quantitative reading.
Furthermore, consider the following passage. Hutcheson writes, “The exercise 
of virtue for a short period, provided it be not succeeded by something vicious, 
is of incomparably greater value than the most lasting sensual pleasures” (System, 
I.ii.7.i, 118). This sounds clearly lexical, but on close examination is compatible 
with the quantitative view. Hutcheson claims not that the smallest amount of the 
pleasures of the moral sense is of incomparably greater welfare value than the 
most lasting sensual pleasures; he claims rather that the exercise of virtue for a short 
period is of incomparably greater value than the most lasting sensual pleasures. 
But the exercise of virtue for a short period triggers the pleasures of the moral 
and evaluative senses, and hence yields long-lasting, intense pleasure—pleasure 
that is of greater quantity than the “most lasting” sensual pleasures.35 
35 of course, this reading cannot accommodate Hutcheson’s term “incomparably” if “incom-
parable” literally means, for Hutcheson, not comparable. But it is not clear that Hutcheson means 
this in using the term “incomparably.” He often uses “incomparably” as a simple intensifier. see, for 
instance Inquiry I.i.8, 22, where “incomparably” is used as interchangeable with “vastly.” (Compare also 
Essay, VI.iv, 121.) However, even if Hutcheson means to literally claim that the higher pleasures are of 
incomparable value, this does not necessarily tell against the quantitative view if Hutcheson regards 
pleasures as delivering either infinite intensity or duration. (see, for instance, riley’s account of Mill’s 
hedonism in “Millian Qualitative superiorities and Utilitarianism, Part II.”) Given his religious proclivi-
ties, Hutcheson might have claimed that the moral pleasures are of infinite duration, given that our 
pleasurable reflex acts might continue into the afterlife. (I thank an anonymous reviewer for making 
this suggestion.) Indeed, as already noted, Hutcheson’s religious views, and the supposition that we 
receive substantial pleasures in the afterlife, play an important role in his theory of the public sense: 
the public sense generates pleasure rather than pain at the shabby state of many living in the world 
because we assume that others will obtain pleasure in the afterlife (cf. Harris, “religion in Hutcheson’s 
Moral Philosophy”). But I hesitate to rest too much on this argument; Hutcheson does not appear to 
claim that the pleasures of the moral sense are of infinite duration. In explaining the long duration of 
the pleasures of the moral sense, Hutcheson writes, “each good action is Matter of pleasant Reflection 
as long as we live” (Essay, V.x, 106; my emphasis). However, even if Hutcheson does not mean to refer 
to some pleasures as being of infinite duration, this causes no problems for the quantitative reading, 
given Hutcheson’s promiscuous use of the term “incomparable.”
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of course, even in the Essay and Inquiry Hutcheson clearly wishes to impart 
an evaluative priority to the higher pleasures as opposed to the lower pleasures. 
But it is important to understand what this priority is and how it functions. When 
discussing the comparative intensity of pleasures, for instance, Hutcheson writes, 
“The Pleasures of the internal Senses, or of the Imagination, are allowed by all, who 
have any tolerable Taste of them, as a much superior Happiness to those of the 
external Senses, tho they were enjoyed to the full.” Here the quantitative reading 
insists that the crucial phrase is “enjoyed to the full.” For some pleasure x to be 
enjoyed to the full is for that pleasure to be enjoyed as much as is possible given 
the type of pleasure x is. To enjoy the pleasures of drinking a beer to the full is 
to enjoy one’s beer as much as a beer can be enjoyed—it most certainly does not 
mean to enjoy an infinite amount of the pleasure of drinking beer (just as “the most 
lasting sensual pleasures” does not mean an infinite amount of the pleasures of 
the external senses; it means the longest-lasting sensual pleasure one might find). 
Hence, on this reading, Hutcheson is claiming that the fullest enjoyment of the 
external pleasures—given their type—will never outweigh even the smallest pos-
sible amount of the pleasures of the internal sense. Why? Because the smallest 
amount of the pleasures of the internal senses will still yield more pleasure than, 
say, beer when “enjoyed to the full.” He is not claiming that any finite amount of 
the pleasures of the external sense will outweigh any amount of the pleasures of 
the internal senses, no matter how small. This holds not simply of the pleasures 
of the internal senses in comparison to the pleasures of the external senses, but 
also of a comparison between the pleasures of virtue and all others: “That in the 
virtuous Man, publick Affections, a moral Sense, and Sense of Honour, actually over-
come all other Desires or senses, even in their full Strength. Here there is the fairest 
Combate, and the success is on the side of Virtue” (Essay, V.iii, 91; my emphasis). 
This results in a strong evaluative priority: the pleasures of the moral sense and 
the sense of dignity are simply more intense than the lower pleasures, though the 
lower pleasures may be “in their full strength.”
While nothing in the passages I have cited in this section tell against the qualita-
tive reading, they do not constitute evidence that the quantitative reading is false, 
or that quantitative hedonism was abandoned or only half-heartedly accepted by 
Hutcheson. Hence Hutcheson’s axiological claims give us no reason to overturn 
a judgment that he is, in fact, a quantitative hedonist. 
5 .  c o n c l u s i o n
When we consider Hutcheson’s moral and hedonic psychology in depth, there is 
good reason to believe that he does not treat the excellence, quality, or “dignity” of 
certain pleasures as a feature in the axiological evaluation of particular pleasures. 
rather, the quality of pleasure is only important insofar as the cooperation of our 
moral and evaluative senses increases the overall quantity of pleasure.
I have also tried to provide a reading of the more strikingly qualitative passages—
especially those found in System I.ii.7—that does not render Hutcheson’s writings 
incoherent or commit Hutcheson to a misunderstanding of the nature of quantita-
tive or qualitative hedonism. This chapter is to some degree slippery and does not 
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obviously permit of easy integration into Hutcheson’s corpus. This fact may itself 
be one partial explanation for Hutcheson’s refusal to publish the System, though it 
was substantially complete years before his death. But I think that though the System 
displays some unique features, we need not read I.ii.7 as fundamentally altering 
Hutcheson’s value theory. What the System does bring out, in contrast to the Essay, 
is the importance of our sense of dignity in contributing—as the moral sense does 
in the Essay and Inquiry—to the overall amount of pleasure we experience. Thus, I 
submit, Hutcheson’s value theory is best read as a form of quantitative hedonism 
that makes liberal use of a variety of moral and non-moral senses. Hutcheson’s 
complex moral psychology masks the simplicity of his hedonism.
